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Path dependence in occupations refers to the observed occupational distrib-
ution in a population or in a sub-population at a point in time that depends
on changes that occurred years or centuries earlier. Path dependence in
occupations can be the outcome of the cumulative concentration of certain
productive activities in speciﬁc regions over time, it can emerge through the
eﬀect of parental income or wealth on oﬀspring’s occupations and incomes,
or it can be the outcome of group eﬀects. Some historical cases are se-
lected to illustrate the various mechanisms through which path dependence
in occupations can emerge or disappear.
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American occupational transition1 Introduction
Path dependence in occupations can be interpreted to mean that the ob-
served occupational distribution in a population or in a sub-population at
a point in time depends on changes that occurred years or centuries earlier
(for example, a war that siphons oﬀ certain types of workers, the enactment
of anti-discriminatory labour practices, a technological invention which is
not gender- or race-neutral). This deﬁnition is consistent with the notion
of path dependence suggested in the economic history literature by David
(1985) with the example of the ‘standard QWERTY’ keyboard. Under this
deﬁnition one can include both the cases in which particular innovations
in the economy have permanent consequences and those instances in which
particular shocks are not self-correcting, so that they remain permanent in
the absence of some countervailing change.
To show that there is path dependence in occupations, one has to de-
scribe the exact sequencing of events related to the initial change and show
that they had a permanent eﬀect on the occupational choice and distribu-
tion observed later. In other words, one has to show that, at a given point
in time, multiple occupational distributions were available for selection, and
theory is unable to predict or explain the occupational structure that will be
chosen. Then, a change occurs and an occupational distribution is favoured
over competing ones. Finally, the selected occupational structure capitalizes
on initial advantage and is stably reproduced over time.
The economics literature identiﬁes a number of possible sources of path
dependence (see for discussions Arthur, 1989; David, 1994; Liebowitz and
Margolis, 1995; Blume and Durlauf, 2005). For example, the economic ge-
ography literature explains path dependence in occupations as the outcome
of the cumulative concentration of certain productive activities in speciﬁc
regions over time (for example, Krugman, 1991b; Fujita, Krugman and Ven-
ables, 1999). This literature highlights the potentially big impact of increas-
ing returns and cumulative processes, which in turn can make the role of
historical accidents decisive. Small changes in the parameters of the econ-
omy may have large eﬀects. For example, if transportation costs, economies
of scale, and the share of non-agricultural goods in expenditure cross a crit-
ical threshold, population may start to concentrate and regions to diverge;
once started this process will feed on itself.
However, increasing returns are not necessary for path dependent processes
(Bowles and Gintis, 2002). For example, in models of intergenerational mo-
bility where individual-level characteristics matter (for example, Becker and
Tomes, 1979; Loury, 1981; Banerjee and Newman, 1991; 1993; Galor and
Zeira, 1993; Eckstein and Zilcha, 1994; Mookherjee and Ray, 2002; 2003),
the existence or absence of path dependence in relative economic status
across generations emerges through the eﬀect of parental income or wealth
on oﬀspring’s occupations and incomes.
1In contrast, starting from the seminal work of Shelling (1971), in mem-
bership models an individual’s economic choices are inﬂuenced not only by
his or her traits but also by characteristics of the group of individuals with
whom the person typically interacts (see Durlauf, 2006, for a discussion of
these models and related empirical literature). Groups may diﬀer in average
level of schooling, cognitive functioning, occupational structure and wealth
level. Some groups are exogenously determined, for example by ethnicity or
gender. Other groups are endogenously determined. For example, individu-
als may be strongly inﬂuenced by groups such as residential neighbourhood,
the schools attended, and the co-workers at various jobs. Group eﬀects on
economic success are well documented and may arise for a number of rea-
sons, including discrimination, conformist eﬀects on behaviour, diﬀerential
access to information, and complementarities in production.
An exhaustive survey of historical and contemporary examples of path
dependence in occupations is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we
selected some examples which illustrate the various mechanisms discussed
above through which path dependence in occupations can emerge or disap-
pear.
2 Jewish Economic History
At the beginning of the ﬁrst millennium, an exogenous change in the re-
ligious and social norm that deﬁned Judaism occurred as a result of the
shift in the leadership within the Jewish community. Before the destruc-
tion of the Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE, the Jewish population in Eretz
Israel, which consisted mainly of farmers, was segmented in many religious
groups. After the destruction of the Temple, many Jewish sects disappeared,
whereas the Pharisees became the dominant group. They replaced sacriﬁces
with the study of the Torah in the synagogue. The transformation of the
religion created the need for the devoted Jews to be literate and to educate
their children. In about 200 CE, the transformation of Judaism reached its
full-ﬂedged stage with the compilation of the Mishna. Also, a new social
norm came to prevail according to which an illiterate Jewish individual was
considered an outcast in the community.
Despite education being very costly and ‘useless’ in production for farm-
ers, religious instruction and primary education became more and more
widespread among the Jewish communities in Palestine and Babylonia from
the second to the seventh century. The spread of literacy among the Jewish
r u r a lp o p u l a t i o ni se v e nm o r ei m p r e s s i v ew h e nc o m p a r e dw i t ht h el i t e r a c y
rates of the non-Jewish rural populati o ni nt h es a m ep e r i o d .I nt h eR o m a n ,
Byzantine, Christian and Persian worlds there was no mandatory primary
education, and the non-Jewish rural population was almost entirely illiter-
ate.
2Before 400 CE almost all Jews in the three main centres of Jewish life in
the classical period - Palestine, Babylonia, and Egypt - were farmers, exactly
like the rest of the population. The transition away from agriculture into
crafts and trade started in the Talmudic period (200-500 CE), especially in
Babylon. In the ﬁfth and sixth centuries, some literate Jews abandoning
agriculture moved to the towns and became small shopkeepers, craftsmen
and artisans. However, given the stagnant economies in the late Roman,
early Byzantine and Persian empires in the fourth to the seventh centuries,
the growing number of literate Jewish farmers could not ﬁnd skilled occu-
pations in the existing cities at that time and many of them converted out
of Judaism. World Jewry was reduced from about 4.5 million in 70 CE to
about 1.5 million in 600 CE, with 80 per cent living in Babylonia.
But in the eighth and ninth centuries, another exogenous event occurred:
massive urbanization in the newly established Muslim empire under the Ab-
basid caliphate vastly increased the demand for urban, skilled occupations.
The literate Jewish rural population in Iraq and later in the Abbasid em-
pire as a whole moved to urban centres, abandoned agriculture, and became
engaged in a wide range of crafts, local and long-distance trade, moneylend-
ing, tax-farming and the medical profession. This occupational transition
took about 150 years, and by 900 almost all Jews in Iraq, Persia, Syria and
Egypt, were engaged in urban occupations. In contrast, most non-Jews re-
mained farmers, even though they could engage in any occupation in the
regions under Muslim rule. These two facts identify the educational reform
in Judaism around 200 CE as the key factor for the occupational transition
of the Jewish people (Botticini and Eckstein, 2005).
Judaism, with its costly religious norm regarding education, can thrive
in the long run only if the Jews can ﬁnd occupations in which their earnings
signiﬁcantly gain from literacy (Botticini and Eckstein, 2006). The volun-
tary diaspora of the Jews to western Europe during the tenth to the 13th
centuries, to eastern Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, and then world-
wide supports this argument. Other minorities within the Muslim empire
under the Abbasid caliphate did not migrate to western Europe even though
no prohibitions prevented them from doing so. The distinctive engine of the
Jewish migrations to the West was the incentive to maximize the returns
to their investment in education. Hence, these two facts identify the link
between the ‘historical accident’ and the voluntary diaspora of the Jews in
search of urban, high-skill and high-income occupations.
The large Jewish population of Iraq and Iran, which amounted to about
800,000 in 1250, almost disappeared when the Mongol invasions brought
the Near East back to a subsistence farming economy. In contrast, the
small Jewish population in Europe survived, kept its literacy and educational
distinctiveness, and through urban and skilled occupations reached high
standards of living.
These urban, skilled occupations remained the distinctive mark of the
3Jewish people throughout their history, as clearly highlighted by the data
provided by Kuznets (1960): in the countries which hosted the largest Jewish
communities in the early 20th century (countries in eastern Europe, Russia,
the United States and Canada), between 96 and 99 per cent of the Jews
were engaged in non-agricultural occupations even though no restrictions
prevented them from being farmers.
Tdeoh 1–Offxsdwlrqdo Swuxfwxuh ri Wruog Jhzu|, fd.1 9 3 0
Country Year (Jews in nonagr. jobs
Jewish labor force %) (Non-Jews in nonagr. jobs
Non-Jewish labor force %)
Poland 1931 96 47
Soviet Union 1926 96 27
United States 1940 98 82
Latvia 1930 99 47
Germany 1933 99 83
Czecholosvakia 1930 91 73
Hungary 1930 97 52
Rumania 1930 96 37
Bulgaria 1926 99 31
Canada 1931 99 71
Source: This table reproduces Table 2 in Kuznets (1960, p. 1608).
Chiswick (2005) documents the same occupational selection of the Jewish
population in the United States as late as the year 2000. For example, about
53 per cent of adult Jewish men are engaged in professions such as law,
medicine, and academia, whereas the percentage for white non-Jewish men
is about 20 per cent. In contrast, only six per cent of adult Jewish men
are employed in the construction, transportation, and production sectors in
comparison with about 39 per cent of adult non-Jewish men.
Jewish economic history ﬁts very well the multiple features of path de-
pendence outlined in the Introduction. On the one hand, two exogenous
changes (the transformation of the religious norm in the ﬁrst and second
centuries CE and the urbanization in the Muslim empire in the eighth and
ninth centuries) created a permanent eﬀect on the occupational distribution
among the Jews. On the other hand, the mechanisms through which these
changes worked to aﬀect the occupational structure of the Jews in the long
run were twofold: the intergenerational transmission of skills and literacy
from parents to children, and the peer pressure (social penalty) that the
Jewish communities imposed on those who did not invest in their children’s
education.
43 Commercial and Trade Diasporas
As membership models would predict, ethnic groups can inﬂuence the oc-
cupational distribution of immigrants in a country and create occupational
clustering by ethnicity. One of the most visible examples of this occupational
clustering is oﬀered by the so-called commercial and trade diasporas.
A diaspora is any ethnic group without a territorial base within a given
polity, and whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders
of nation states. In particular, trade and commercial diasporas are those
diasporas whose members specialize in trade and commercial activities or,
more generally, in urban, skilled jobs. Historical examples include the Jews
in the last two millennia, the Parsi (Zoroastrian) diaspora from Iran, the
Huguenots in early-modern and modern western Europe, the Armenians, the
Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, the Germans throughout eastern Europe in
modern times, the Chinese in many areas of south-east Asia from the 15th
to the 20th century, the Indian middleman minorities of east Africa and
Malaya, the Pakistanis in Great Britain, and the Lebanese Christians in
18th-century Egypt and contemporary west Africa (Botticini, 2003).
Commercial and trade diasporas - indeed, diasporas in general - have
been characterized by strong linguistic skills, often including the ability to
speak and write in both their own and alien languages. This enabled mem-
bers of a diaspora to maintain communication networks within the group and
to use alien languages for practical purposes. Maintaining the common orig-
inal language is one of the means to enhance the organization of a diaspora.
Others mechanisms include the establishment of communal institutions, such
as the commercial coalitions among the Jews in the Mediterranean in the
high Middle Ages (Greif, 1989) or the Chinese societies known as Houei; the
development of a common set of commercial laws or norms whose enforce-
ment is delegated to courts within the communities; and strong endogamous
marriage strategies.
In some cases, exogenous changes have created or reinforced occupational
selection among ethnic or religious groups. For example, it has been often
argued that legal prohibitions and the exclusion of Jews from guild mem-
bership in medieval and early-modern Europe would account for their occu-
pational selection into moneylending and the medical profession. Similarly,
it has been pointed out that, after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by
King Louis XIV in 1685 that made Protestantism illegal, many Huguenots
(French Protestants) emigrated to Ireland, England, Prussia, and America,
where they contributed to the development of industries and trades. The
Agricultural Law of 1870 in Indonesia against land ownership by ethnic Chi-
nese has been cited to explain the exclusion of the Chinese diaspora from
farming and agricultural activities.
In other instances, the occupational distribution was altered by rulers
who substituted one diaspora for another if they perceived the change to be
5advantageous for them. Thus, in the Ottoman Empire, Catholic Levantines,
who held the leadership in crafts and trade in the 15th century, were replaced
by the Jews in the 16th and 17th centuries, followed by the Greeks until the
beginning of the 19th century and Armenians during the 19th century.
Geography also played a role in the occupational specialization of some
ethnic groups. With the European geographical expansions and the estab-
lishment of colonial rule in south-east Asia and west and east Africa during
the 19th and 20th centuries, Lebanese Christians, Chinese, and Indians have
contributed to the establishment of commercial economies in the European
colonial empires.
4 The Manufacturing Belt in the United States
The establishment and remarkable persistence of the manufacturing belt
in the United States is one of the most prominent examples of geographic
concentration which in turn aﬀected the occupational distribution of the US
population.
Early in the history of the United States, when most of the population
was engaged in agriculture, when transportation costs were high, and when
manufacturing was characterized by few economies of scale, no concentration
could occur. When the United States started to industrialize, manufacturing
ﬁrst developed in regions where most of the agricultural population outside
the South was located. The manufacturing belt developed in the second half
of the 19th century when economies of scale in manufacturing increased,
transportation costs fell, and the share of the population in non-agricultural
occupations rose. The initial advantage of the manufacturing belt was locked
in, leading the bulk of US manufacturing to be concentrated in a relatively
small part of the north-east and the eastern part of the Midwest. It persisted
even as the centre of gravity of agricultural and mineral production shifted
to the West. As late as 1957, the manufacturing belt still contained 64 per
cent of US manufacturing employment (Krugman, 1991a).
5 Intergenerational Occupational Mobility in Britain
and the United States
Unlike today, the United States in the 19th century was ‘exceptional’ in
the occupational mobility experienced by its population (as well as in its
geographic mobility) compared with Europe. As documented by Long and
Ferrie (2005), this contrast is even more striking when 19th-century United
States is compared with 19th-century Britain - the country with which it
shared legal traditions and property rights systems and sources of labour,
capital, and technology.
6Diﬀerences have been attributed to a number of factors. First, the ab-
sence of feudalism and of strong craft guilds has been put forth as one reason
for the higher occupational mobility in the United States. Second, at least
some of the high mobility in 19th-century United States may result from it
being at an earlier stage of development than 19th-century Britain, so its
farm sector was relatively larger.
Third, the United States provided considerably more public education
than Britain in the middle of the 19th century: the primary school enrol-
ment rate was one and a half times greater in the United States than in
Britain. The US educational system in the second half of the 19th cen-
tury, though less extensive at the secondary and post-secondary levels than
European systems, was considerably more egalitarian (Goldin and Katz,
2003). To the extent that intergenerational mobility is greater where fewer
parents are wealth-constrained, superior mobility in the United States may
well have been a consequence of its educational system, which provided a
public alternative to a private education that was outside the reach of many
families.
Fourth, residential mobility to places that were growing more rapidly
than others may have provided an alternative to direct investment in human
capital. Cities (such as Chicago) sprang up initially to provide services
demanded as the frontier expanded. Though US labour markets in the
North were well-integrated at the regional level by the middle of the 19th
century, diﬀerences across smaller units of geography may have continued
to present opportunities for ‘locational arbitrage’ that provided a route to
occupational change through the start of the 20th century (Long and Ferrie,
2005).
6 The Feminization of Teaching and Clerical Work
Teaching Profession
Today in the United States the vast majority of elementary and sec-
ondary teachers are women. In 2000, the female proportion among teachers
was 76 per cent. Much earlier in American history, however, this was not
the case. The feminization of teaching occurred over the course of the 19th
century and continued throughout the 20th century. Two exogenous fac-
tors changed the social norm and attitude towards female teachers in the
United States and, therefore, signiﬁcantly contributed to the feminization of
teaching: (a) the ethnic, national, and cultural identity of the European set-
tlers who established their communities in the Northern, Midwestern, and
Southern states, and (b) the wars (especially the American Civil War and
the First World War).
Relatively early in the 19th century, women came to dominate teaching
in New England through the establishment of two educational institutions:
7the so-called ‘dame schools’ and a two-tier system divided into winter and
summer sessions. The ‘dame schools’ were an educational institution im-
ported by British settlers, in which women taught very young children as
they were considered the natural carers for these children. The division into
winter and summer sessions reinforced this gender-speciﬁc assignment of
teachers to pupils according to age. As winter sessions were geared towards
older boys, male teachers were considered to have greater human capital and
skills to enforce discipline among them. Female teachers were considered
better equipped to teach summer sessions attended by younger children. As
population spread westward in the North, the female percentage in teaching
increased in these states (Carter and Margo, 2007).
In contrast, because of the diﬀerent ethnic and national background of
the European settlers who established themselves in the U.S. South, neither
‘dame schools’ nor the two-tier system were developed and the percent of
female teachers remained much lower there until the Civil War. But even
within the North itself, the role of culture and institutions in aﬀecting the
gender distribution in the teaching profession is illustrated by regional vari-
ation. In Illinois counties where the settlers were mainly Yankees, female
teachers were quite common, whereas in those counties where the settlers
were mainly Southerners, male teachers predominated (Carter and Margo,
2007).
As Perlmann and Margo (2001) have shown, the American Civil War
signiﬁcantly contributed to the feminization of teaching. In 13 Northern and
Midwestern states, the average share of female teachers rose from about 57
per cent in 1860 to 67 per cent in 1865 and 79 per cent in 1915. During the
war women took jobs in teaching, substituting for men who were at war.
When the war ended, there was some mean reversion, but not back to the
original equilibrium.
The entry of many women into teaching during the Civil War changed
the social norm and attitudes toward female teachers by making the bias
against them gradually fade. In the earlier decades, the argument against
hiring female teachers had been that, especially in winter classes when adult
boys attended school, women lacked the skills to discipline these students.
However, the entry of women in the teaching profession during the war to
substitute for the male teachers gave them the opportunity to show that they
could be as eﬀective as their male colleagues in teaching and maintaining
the discipline among students. This changed the social norm and attitude
toward hiring female teachers, which increased the feminization of teaching
in both the Northern states and in the South, where the share of female
teachers reached unprecedented levels, rising from about 35 per cent in 1875
to 73 per cent in 1915 (Perlmann and Margo, 2001, p. 169).
The First War World had a similar eﬀect on the selection of women
into the teaching profession, although on a smaller scale. After the Second
World War, women entered many other occupations and professions. Yet
8the predominance of female teachers in primary and secondary schools holds
to the present day.
Clerical work
In 1870, fewer than three per cent of all clerical employees were women.
In 1930, women made up over half (52.5 per cent) of the total clerical work-
force, and today the clerical sector is one of the major employers of women.
The most rapid increases occurred in two decades, 1880-90 and 1910-20,
as the outcome of two exogenous shocks on the demand side of the labour
market coupled with a profound transformation on the supply side of the
same market.
On the demand side, Rotella (1981) has argued that the adoption and
diﬀusion of the typewriter in the 1880s, the growth of large ﬁrms and the
expansion of the government sector in the 1910s created a huge demand for
clerical work. Speciﬁcally, the diﬀusion of the typewriter made the skills re-
quired of clerical labour no longer ﬁrm-speciﬁc, as it had been when employ-
ers preferred to hire male workers who were expected to have a long working
life within the ﬁrm. With the development of the modern, mechanized of-
ﬁce, employers could aﬀord to hire young, educated women who had high
expected turnover and who desired clean, high-status employment. Later,
in the 1910s, the growth of large ﬁrms and the expansion of the government
sector through regulation and tax laws greatly increased the demand for in-
formation and information processing within ﬁrms and government oﬃces.
Again, this shift in demand was not gender neutral: it favoured women, and
women came to dominate oﬃce work, basically after about 1910.
On the supply side, Goldin (1986; 1990) has shown that the huge increase
in high school attendance around the turn of the 20th century - the so-
called ‘high school movement’ - dramatically increased the supply of young,
educated women in the labour market. These women oﬀered a relatively
c h e a p e ra n de a s i e rt om o n i t o rl a b o u rf o r c e .
7 The Occupational Transition of African-Americans
After the American Civil War, a steady stream of African-Americans moved
out of the South to the North. It has been estimated that from 1870 to 1910
about 535,000 blacks emigrated from the South on the net as the outcome
of the large wage diﬀerentials between the North and the South and of the
increased human capital acquired by the ﬁrst generations of blacks after the
Emancipation (Margo, 1990, ch. 7). This migration, though, did not have
a huge impact on the overall occupational and residential distribution of
African-Americans. In fact, in 1900 approximately 90 per cent of the blacks
still lived in the South, and the majority of them worked in agriculture and
were very poor.
9In contrast, from 1910 to 1950 the Great Migration brought about 3.5
million African-American people out of the South mainly to the urban North.
Even when migration occurred to rural areas in the North, it invariably in-
volved a shift out of agriculture. The Great Migration represented a wa-
tershed in African-American economic history and implied a profound and
permanent transformation of the occupational distribution of the blacks in
the United States.
The relevant exogenous shocks that fuelled both the Great Migration
and the permanent change in the occupational distribution of the blacks
were the two world wars and a combination of government policies.
First, quotas set by the US government on foreign immigration after the
First World War greatly accelerated the outmigration of blacks from the
South in the 1920s, as blacks were substitutes for the foreign-born immi-
grants (Collins, 1997).
Second, the Second World War was an even bigger exogenous shock.
When the United States entered the war, demand for white workers in the
war-industry sector increased at the same time as the military was siphoning
oﬀ potential workers. US employers were faced with a tough choice: either
to follow the prevailing taste for discrimination among employers and white
workers and the social norm against hiring black workers, or to expand
production and to gain proﬁts by hiring black workers.
The enforcement by President Roosevelt of the anti-discriminatory policy
amongst defence contractors through the Fair Employment Practice Com-
mittee (FEPC) established in 1941 was the exogenous change in government
policy that helped employers choose the second option and hire black workers
despite the prevailing taste for discrimination (Collins, 2001). The impact of
this government intervention was twofold. It made defence contractors hire
black male workers who otherwise would not have been hired because of the
hostility of white male workers towards hiring fellow black workers. At the
same time, it started changing the social norm and attitude against hiring
black workers in other ﬁrms and industries in those instances when the en-
forcement of the anti-discriminatory policy among the defence contractors
sector had spillover eﬀects on other ﬁrms’ hiring practices.
The combination of the two exogenous shocks - the Second World War
and the establishment of the Fair Employment Practice Committee - had
a large impact on the occupational and residential transition of African-
Americans. Between 1940 and 1950 the proportion of black male workers
classiﬁed as operatives (semi-skilled) rose from 12.6 to 21.4 per cent, and
the proportion in manufacturing industries rose from 16.2 to 23.9 per cent
(Collins, 2000). This transition into manufacturing and war-related indus-
tries greatly contributed to the economic progress of blacks, as the data on
the substantial wage premium these workers earned indicate.
A similar eﬀect occurred ten years later as the outcome of another major
change in government policy. The Brown vs Board of Education Supreme
10Court’s decision in 1954, which invalidated school segregation in the US
South, the enactment of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which for-
bade discrimination in employment, the establishment of the Oﬃce of Fed-
eral Contract Compliance (OFCC), which monitored the anti-discrimination
and aﬃrmative action responsibilities of government contractors, and the
passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were the most famous among sev-
eral government policies designed to eliminate discrimination against blacks.
Donohue and Heckman (1991) show that a signiﬁcant portion of the sus-
tained improvement in the labour market status of black males from 1965
to 1975 (especially in the US South) was the outcome of these changes in
government policies.
8P o v e r t y T r a p s
Intertemporal social interactions (that is, social interactions in which choices
made at one time aﬀect others made later) can create path dependence
in occupations through a variety of mechanisms. Role models and peer
group eﬀect models are two examples of these mechanisms. Suppose, as role
models do, that the decision to attend college by a young adult depends on
the percentage of college graduates among adults in his community. Then
two communities, one where the adults are all college graduates and the
other where none is, can converge to diﬀerent levels of college attendance
in a steady state, leading to path dependence in occupational and economic
segregation across long time periods and generations.
The persistence of ghettoes and poverty traps are the two most visi-
ble examples of the intertemporal eﬀect of group membership on individual
outcomes (Bowles, Durlauf, and Hoﬀ, 2006). Poverty traps are situations
where the evolution of individual wealth is governed by a path-dependent
process such that, depending on initial conditions, otherwise identical indi-
viduals or groups (ethnic, linguistic, religious) may remain for long periods
of time ‘locked into’ poverty. The key characteristic of a poverty trap is that
the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ outcomes are self-enforcing, so that small interventions
or chance events will not alter the long-term outcome. Recent evidence of
the persistence of income diﬀerences between races, even after some of the
structural determinants of inequality (such as colonialism, inequalities of ed-
ucational opportunity, and de jure segregation) have been removed, point to
the importance of historical contingency and ‘lock-in eﬀects’ in the process
that generates inequality (Loury, 2002; Bowles, 2006).
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